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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ 
responses to changes in federal cigarette taxes (i.e. vertical tax interactions). Using 1975-2000 state 
cigarette tax data, we find that reputation-building strategies affect the nature of vertical tax 
externalities. Lame duck governors exhibit a more negative response to changes in the federal 
cigarette tax. Thus, by reducing the state tax base and by causing a decline in the state tax, an 
increase in the federal tax rate reduces state tax revenues in states headed by lame ducks.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature studying reputation-building has documented how state tax-, expenditure-, minimum 
wage- and environmental policies differ when a governor is in his last term in office due to term 
limit legislation (e.g., Besley and Case 1995; List and Sturm 2006).
1
 This suggests that politicians 
distort policy choices in order to get re-elected, but that when facing a binding term limit lame ducks 
act according to their preferred policies since re-election is no longer a consideration. This literature 
has not explored whether reputation-building influences “vertical tax interactions” in federal 
systems, where taxes set at one level of government (e.g., the federal level) affect the tax base of 
another level of government (e.g., the state level).
2
 In this paper, we investigate a novel empirical 
research question: Are state governors’ responses to federal policymaking (i.e. vertical tax 
interactions) guided by reputation-building strategies? In particular, we focus on vertical interactions 
in cigarette taxation.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that governors may behave differently when in lame duck status. 
For example, Gov. Otis Ray Bowen (R) of Indiana made no changes in the state cigarette tax in his 
first incumbency period as the federal tax was held constant at 8 cents/pack (thus, a positive 
response in real terms). On the other hand, in his second year as a lame duck (year 1978) he raised 
the state cigarette tax from 6 cents to 10.5 cents, a negative response to the declining real federal 
cigarette tax.
3
 We seek to investigate the generality of this changed behavior. 
Two strands of the literature guide our empirical work. First, the theoretical literature on vertical 
tax externalities identifies a multitude of (opposing) effects of a federal tax change on state 
                                               
1
 35 states had gubernatorial term limits in year 2000, and term limits may consequently have significant 
policy effects.  
2
 A growing literature examines such “vertical tax externalities” in federal systems (see, e.g., Besley and 
Rosen 1998; Devereux et al. 2007).  
3
 Gov. Thomas H. Kean (R) of New Jersey raised the nominal state cigarette tax in year 1983 as a response to 
the 1983 nominal increase in the federal cigarette tax (a positive response, in real terms), but in 1987 he raised 
this state tax again without any nominal change in the federal tax (i.e., a negative response, in real terms).  
 3 
commodity taxes. Determinants of the slope of the state reaction function include the price-elasticity 
of demand, revenue effects, the extent of cross-border shopping, and horizontal tax competition (see, 
e.g., Besley and Rosen 1998; Keen 1998; Devereux et al. 2007).
4
 The empirical literature on vertical 
tax externalities generally finds positive or insignificant effects on U.S. state cigarette and gasoline 
taxes of a change in the corresponding federal excise tax.
5
 This literature has not incorporated the 
effect of reputation-building strategies.  
Second, the seminal paper by Besley and Case (1995) provides a reputation-building model 
where voters with imperfect information re-elect a governor with a higher probability, the greater the 
incumbent’s effort (which yields more “successful” policies and high voter utility) and reputation 
(see also Barro 1970; Banks and Sundaram 1998). In the governor’s final term she finds herself a 
                                               
4
 Keen (1998) and Devereux et al. (2007) argue that the price-elasticity of demand (the elasticity of the tax 
base) is an important determinant of the sign of the tax reaction function. Besley and Rosen (1998) argue that 
a revenue effect arises from the need of states to raise tax rates in order to keep state revenues intact, which 
results in a positive response to a federal tax hike. Devereux et al. also discuss the case of cross-border 
shopping and horizontal tax competition. When no cross-border shopping occurs, the state commodity tax 
responds negatively to the federal tax when demand is linear, but positively if demand is iso-elastic. When 
cross–border shopping is intense and demand is relatively price–inelastic, the state commodity tax will be 
unresponsive to the federal tax rate (but highly positively responsive to neighboring states’ rates); when 
demand instead is elastic, the response is ambiguous (Devereux et al.). Besley and Rosen (1998) and Keen 
(1998) in addition argue that a federal tax hike increases the marginal value of state public goods, raising the 
attractiveness of the state tax. Keen points out that when the federal tax raises the consumer price and thus 
reduces demand for the good, the welfare loss resulting from the state tax declines, yielding a positive 
response. Moreover, Besley and Rosen suggest that there may be complementarity and substitutability effects 
among various types of taxes, in the presence of non–separabilities in demand. This suggests ambiguous 
responses by states. Besley and Rosen furthermore identify the possibility of endogenously determined 
expenditure effects, where states reduce public spending as a response to federal tax increases. This also 
yields an ambiguous effect on state taxes.  
5
 See Besley and Rosen (1998) using 1975-89 data; Devereux et al. (2007) using 1977-97 data; Fredriksson 
and Mamun (2008) using 1975-2001 data; Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) report a negative vertical cigarette 
tax externality for years 1982-2001, however. The empirical literature also explores other areas of taxation. 
Boadway and Hayashi (2001) and Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) report negative effects on Canadian 
provincial corporate taxes, and Goodspeed (2000) finds a negative effect on U.S. state income taxes of federal 
income tax changes. Esteller–Moré and Solé–Ollé (2001) establish a positive impact on U.S. state taxes of 
federal personal income and general sales taxes, whereas Esteller–Moré and Solé–Ollé (2002) report a similar 
relationship for Canadian income taxes. Brülhart and Jametti (2006) find a positive vertical externality on 
Swiss personal and corporate sub–national taxes. For other theoretical and empirical contributions to the tax 
competition literature, see, for example, Boadway et al. (1998), Boadway and Hayashi (2001), Hoyt (2001), 
and Ravelli (2003). See Brueckner (2003) for a useful survey of the literature on horizontal tax externalities. 
 4 
lame duck without re-election prospects, with no payoff from building reputation.
6
 Thus, she puts in 
less effort and her policy choices will differ from earlier periods.
7
  
The empirical literature on reputation-building includes Besley and Case (1995), who find that 
Democratic lame duck governors set significantly higher total state taxes per capita and higher state 
expenditures than other governors. Millimet et al. (2004) find that Republican lame ducks raise state 
taxes and spending per capita more than do Democratic lame ducks.
8
 List and Sturm (2006) report 
that governors’ environmental policy choices change noticeably once they obtain lame duck status, 
and the change is conditional on the environmental preferences of the electorate. The empirical 
literature on reputation-building has not yet investigated vertical tax interactions.  
We merge the insights from the different literatures discussed above. The following testable 
prediction emerges regarding last-term governors’ responses to changes in the federal tax rate: if re-
electable governors are guided by reputation-building strategies, “lame duck” governors will respond 
differently to federal tax changes than do other governors. While the existing empirical literature has 
generally found positive responses by states to real federal tax changes, these estimates are averages 
                                               
6
 This assumption is supported by empirical evidence provided by Besley and Case (1995) who report that 
lame duck governors do not appear to care for either their own or their party’s reputation, as suggested by 
their finding that only re-electable governors respond to natural disasters by raising expenditures. 
7
 Several political forces may affect the ability and willingness of lame duck governors to changes behavior in 
their last incumbency period (Besley and Case 1995). First, governors may be constrained in their ability to 
set policies freely by legislatures, constitutions, or their political parties. Second, governors may eye another 
political office after the stay in the governor’s mansion is over. Lame duck governors may therefore continue 
to build reputation. Third, a potential successor from the same party may offer the incumbent compensation 
for keeping the party’s reputation intact (Alesina and Spear 1988). Forth, the incumbent lame duck may want 
to raise the probability that a party colleague wins the next election, as it raises the probability that future 
policies are closer to the incumbent’s ideology (Harrington 1992). Fifth, the lame duck may be concerned 
about her legacy. Finally, she may eye a future position in the private sector. These effects would all work to 
reduce the effect of term limits. Our empirical work below suggests that these forces are insufficient to 
completely neutralize the effects of term limits.  
8 
Besley and Case (2003) extend the data set to 1997 and find a significant effect only for state expenditures. 
Millimet et al. (2004) extend the sample to 1999, and report stronger positive effects than the earlier 
literature. Lott (1987) and Lott and Bronars (1993) used voluntary retirements from the U.S. Congress as an 
indicator of a binding term limit in order to detect changes in voting patterns during the last term in office. 
Little evidence was uncovered of such behavior.  
 5 
that may mask a different response by re-electable governors and lame duck governors, 
respectively.
9
  
Utilizing state-level panel data for 1975-2000, we find that lame duck governors do exhibit a 
different response to federal cigarette tax changes relative to their non-lame-duck counterparts. In 
fact, our estimates suggest that while re-electable governors exhibit a positive response to real 
federal cigarette tax changes, lame ducks have a negative response. We find some evidence that our 
results tend to be driven particularly by Republican governors.
10
  
It appears that an increase in the federal cigarette tax rate reduces state tax revenues in states 
headed by lame ducks, both by reducing the state tax base and by causing a decline in the state 
cigarette tax.
11
 By merging the literature on reputation-building and vertical tax externalities, we 
believe our empirical results complement the existing literature.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the empirical model and data. Section III 
presents the results, and Section IV provides a brief conclusion. 
II. Empirical Analysis 
The Empirical Model 
Drawing on the existing literature discussed above, we distill one testable implication. If 
reputation-building occurs, the response to the federal cigarette tax should differ between re-
electable and lame duck governor status, i.e. it is conditional on governor lame duck status. The 
following basic empirical model is estimated: 
 ,itittit
f
tit
f
ti
s
it ZXltltt       (1)  
                                               
9
 For example, suppose governors with an re-election motive exhibit a positive response to federal tax 
changes. If reputation-building occurs, lame ducks will have either a significantly greater positive response, a 
smaller positive response, or a negative response. 
10
 Our results should not necessarily be attributed to the party affiliation of governors, but may be driven by 
the preferences of the state level electorate.  
11
 Tobacco tax revenues are substantial in the U.S. For example, in 1997 U.S. consumers spent $52.6bn on 
tobacco products, out of which $5.7bn was federal taxes, and $7.8bn was state and local taxes, according to 
Gale et al. (2000). 
 6 
where 
s
itt  is the cigarette tax rate in state i in year t, i is a state fixed effect, 
f
tt  is the federal 
cigarette tax in year t, itl  is a dummy variable equal to one if the governor in state i  has lame duck 
status in year t, it
f
t lt   is the corresponding interaction variable, tX  are the time varying controls 
common to all states, itZ  are the time and state varying controls, and it  is a random error term. 
The coefficients of particular interest are   and  . Note that year fixed effects cannot be included 
due to the inclusion of the time varying variables ftt and Xt. 
Data and Hypothesis Specification 
Our data set spans 1975 to 2000 and comprises 47 contiguous U.S. states.
12
 All sources and 
variable definitions, as well as summary statistics, are reported in Table 1. The state and federal 
cigarette excise tax rates (per pack of 20 cigarettes) come from Orzechowski and Walker (2003) and 
are deflated to 1983 constant $ prices. The state tax rates (STATETAX) vary substantially across 
states and over time. The nominal state cigarette tax rate increased for most states between 1975 and 
2000, although not every state exhibited an increasing trend. In 2000, the state cigarette excise tax 
rate ranged from $0.025 per pack in Virginia to $1.11 in New York. The federal tax rate (FEDTAX) 
is identical for all states in any given year (of course). From 1952 to 1982 the nominal federal tax 
rate was 8 cents per pack, but by year 2000 it had increased to 34 cents (after several tax hikes). 
Figure 1 presents the pattern of real cigarette tax rates over the sample period for: (i) the three states 
with greatest real increases (CA, NY, and WA); (ii) the three states with the greatest real declines 
(KY, NC, and VA); and (iii) the real federal tax rate.  
Data on gubernatorial term limits come from List and Sturm (2006). LAMEDUCK takes a 
value of one if the incumbent governor is currently facing a binding term limit, and zero otherwise.  
In many U.S. states, governors face term limits after two terms in office. However, no limit, one, and 
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 Nebraska has a non-partisan, unicameral state legislature. We therefore drop Nebraska completely from our 
data set, following, e.g., Reed (2006). 
 7 
three term limits also existed during our sample period. Table A1 in the appendix describes the 
pattern of term limit legislation across states during the sample period. FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK is an 
interaction variable of main interest in this study. 
 In order to distinguish the policy responses by governor political party, we differentiate lame 
ducks by party affiliation. DEMOLAME represents lame duck Democrats, and REPLAME their 
Republican counterparts. DEMOLAME and REPLAME take a value of one if a lame duck governor 
is a Democrat and Republican, respectively. The interactions FEDTAX×DEMOLAME and 
FEDTAX×REPLAME are consequently of particular interest.   
We utilize the same set of control variables as Besley and Rosen (1998). In order to control 
for political party dominance, we use (i) a dummy variable equal to one if the state governor is a 
Democrat (DEMOGOV), (ii) the proportion of Democrats in the state Senate (DEMOSENATE), and 
(iii) the proportion of Democrats in the state House (DEMOHOUSE). The state governor data comes 
from the National Governors Association (2005), while the proportions of Democrats in Senate and 
House come from various editions of the Statistical Abstracts of the United States (U.S. Census 
Bureau (various years)).  
National real GDP (NatlGDP) and the national unemployment rate (NatlUNEMPLOY) 
capture fluctuations in the national economic climate. These variables represent the tX  controls in 
Eqn. (1). The time- and state-varying controls Zit in Eqn. (1) consist of state demographic and 
economic variables such as the total state population (POPULATION), real state income per capita 
(INCOME), state unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYstate), the portion of population in the state 
between five and 17 years of age (CHILD), and over 65 years old (OVER65).
13
 The national real 
GDP, population, and state income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. 
Department of Commerce (various years)), and the state unemployment rates are from the Bureau of 
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 All models also include POPULATION and INCOME squared, as well as a time trend and its square.  
 8 
Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor (various years)). The data on the national unemployment 
rate and the proportion of children and the aged in the population are from various editions of the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau (various years)).  
Next, TOBACCO INCOME equals tobacco production per dollar of state income, and comes 
from USDA (various years); it measures the relative importance of tobacco for the state. In addition, 
GAS measures gasoline production per dollar of state income. Tobacco producers may be expected 
to lobby for lower cigarette taxes, while gasoline producers should take the opposite stance (to 
reduce the need to raise gas tax revenue). GRANTS is federal grants/capita, which reduces the need 
to raise state tax revenues. INCOME TAX is the federal income tax divided by adjusted gross 
income, which seeks to capture the ability of states to engage in further taxation effort. The daily 
gasoline production data comes from the U.S. Department of Energy (various years) database, 
whereas federal grant and income tax data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau (various years). 
III. Empirical Results 
 As shown by Moulton (1986), OLS estimations may give spurious results if the dependent 
variable is at the individual level and one or more of the independent variables are at the aggregate 
level. Thus, we utilize White (1980) robust standard errors and allow for within-year correlations.
14
 
All tables report the joint significance of FEDTAX and its interactions with LAMEDUCK. 
Basic Model Results 
 Table 2 reports basic results using LAMEDUCK and various combinations of party power 
control variables (DEMOGOV, DEMOSENATE, and DEMOHOUSE) and their FEDTAX 
interactions. FEDTAX is positive in all models in Table 2, and significant in Models I-IV. 
LAMEDUCK is consistently positive and significant in all models, while the 
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 The variance of the estimators is calculated by multiplying the residuals and the regressors, then summing within year 
(cluster). This allows within-year correlations that affect the estimated standard errors and the variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimators, but not the estimated coefficients (see Rogers 1993; Williams 2000; Wooldridge 2002 for 
detailed discussions). 
 9 
FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK interaction is significant and negative in all models. Moreover, FEDTAX 
and FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK are jointly significant in all models. In economic terms (performing all 
calculations in cents), Model I, e.g., suggests that a 10 cent increase in FEDTAX results in a 3.7 cent 
increase in STATETAX in states without a lame duck governor, but a 1 cent decrease [10×(0.37 – 
0.47)= –1] in STATETAX in states with a lame duck in office.   
The results in Table 2 thus suggest that lame duck governors have a different response to real 
federal tax changes than other governors. While governors eligible for re-election have a positive 
response to FEDTAX, lame ducks tend to exhibit a negative response. Thus, it appears that a federal 
tax hike undermines state income in states governed by lame ducks, both by reducing the tax base 
and by causing a decline in the state tax rate. The non-lame duck behavior is consistent with the 
revenue effect identified by Besley and Rosen (1998) who argue that states raise tax rates in order to 
keep state revenues intact as the federal tax rises (conversely, states lower the state tax as the federal 
tax declines). Lame ducks, on the other hand, appear to let the level of revenues (and likely public 
good provision) decline when the federal tax rises. However, lame ducks appear to emphasize 
revenues when the federal tax decreases - they raise the state tax simultaneously as the tax base 
expands.  
Note also that our results suggest that holding FEDTAX constant, a lame duck governor 
raises STATETAX somewhat. This softens the effect of an increase in FEDTAX. For example, Model 
I in Table 2 suggests that a lame duck raises STATETAX by 0.238 cents at the mean of FEDTAX. 
Thus, a 10 cent increase in FEDTAX occurring when a lame duck is in office yields an overall 
[10×(0.37 – 0.47) + 0.238 =] 0.76 cent decrease in STATETAX (at the mean of FEDTAX).   
 Table 3 takes a closer look at the effect of lame duck governors’ party affiliation. In Table 3, 
we separate Democratic lame duck governors (DEMOLAME) and Republican lame duck governors 
 10 
(REPLAME).
15
 FEDTAX is significant and positive in Models I-IV, while both 
FEDTAX×DEMOLAME and FEDTAX×REPLAME are consistently negative and significant in all 
five models. Table 3 suggests that Democratic and Republican lame ducks both engage in 
reputation-building activities. Note, however, that the REPLAME and REPLAME×FEDTAX 
coefficients are consistently greater in absolute value than DEMOLAME and its FEDTAX 
interaction. This suggests that Republican governors may be more heavily involved in reputation-
building activities. For example, Model IV in Table 3 suggests that while Democratic lame ducks 
respond to a 10 cent increase in FEDTAX by cutting STATETAX by 0.5 cents ([10× (0.32– 0.37)] =-
0.5), their Republican counterparts reduce STATETAX by 2.4 cents ([10×(0.32-0.56)] =-2.4). Thus, 
an increase in FEDTAX tends to reduce state cigarette tax revenues particularly in states governed by 
a Republican lame duck (via a declining tax base and STATETAX).  
Control Variables 
 In Tables 2-3, the FEDTAX interactions with DEMOGOV, DEMOSENATE, or 
DEMOHOUSE are never significant.
16
 However, DEMOGOV reaches significance in four of the 
eight models where included in Tables 2-3, DEMOHOUSE is significant in two out of four models, 
while DEMOSENATE is never significant. NatlGDP has a consistently positive (and generally 
significant) effect on STATETAX, suggesting that higher average national income growth raises the 
willingness to tax cigarettes in the states. On the other hand, INCOME is negative and significant in 
all models in Tables 2-3, indicating that states with (potentially) higher income tax revenues may, on 
the margin, have a lower need to tax cigarettes in order to meet revenue targets and provide public 
goods. Large POPULATION values appear to have a similar effect. Young states (as measured by 
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 Note that in all models included in Table 3, the excluded category is Republican governors not facing a 
term limit, except for Model I where it is any governor not facing the term limit. Moreover, the effect of the 
federal tax rate is allowed to differ between non-DEMOLAME and REPLAME in Models III and V. 
Incorporating this difference in other models does not change the results. 
16
 R
2
 varies between 0.33 and 0.35 for the models reported in Tables 2 and 3.  
 11 
CHILD) have higher cigarette taxes, perhaps in order to fund schools or discourage smoking. The 
negative OVER65 coefficients suggest that older populations, who may have a larger share of 
smokers, are associated with lower cigarette taxes. The signs of TOBACCO INCOME and GAS 
suggest that both tobacco and gasoline producing states have lobbies successfully influencing 
cigarette tax rates in their favored directions. However, apart from Model IV in Table 2, TOBACCO 
INCOME is never significant in Tables 2-3. The remaining controls do not reveal consistently 
significant coefficients either.  
Robustness Analysis  
Tables 4 and 5 offer a robustness analysis based on Model IV in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
In the following, we discuss Tables 4 and 5 simultaneously, unless otherwise noted.
17
 In Model I, 
FEDTAX is instrumented by the federal deficit as a percentage of national GDP, following Besley 
and Rosen (1998). The state and federal cigarette tax rates may simultaneously be affected by some 
common factor, which may motivate state and federal governments to act simultaneously. For 
example, new information may become available on the adverse health consequences of smoking. 
Moreover, the federal government may also be influenced by state governments’ tax changes. In all 
models using instruments (Models I, V, and VI in Tables 4-5), we report the F-test of joint 
significance of the instrument in each first-stage regression (see Staiger and Stock, 1997). Tables A2 
and A3 in the appendix in addition report the following tests: (i) Shea’s (1997) partial R2: when 
multiple endogenous regressors are used, the F-statistics and partial R
2
 measures from the first-stage 
regressions will not reveal weakness of the instruments. Shea’s partial R2 measure takes the inter-
correlations among the instruments into account (Shea 1997; Godfrey 1999); (ii) Kleibergen-Paap 
LM under-identification test (Kleibergen and Paap 2006); (iii) Kleibergen-Paap Wald under-
                                               
17 The “standard controls” included in all models in Tables 4-5 are: DEMOGOV, 
DEMOSENATE,DEMOHOUSE, NatlGDP, NatlUNEMPLOY, POPULATION, INCOME, StateUNEMPLOY, 
CHILD, OVER65, TOBACCO INCOME, GAS, GRANTS, and INCOME TAX, square terms for POPULATION 
and INCOME, a constant, and a time trend and its square (results available upon request). 
 12 
identification test (Kleibergen and Paap 2006). Tests (ii) and (iii) test whether the equation is 
identified; (iv) the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic (Kleibergen and Paap 2006) tests for weak 
identification. The F statistic should be compared with the critical values for the Cragg-Donald weak 
id test (see Stock and Yogo 2005); (v) the Anderson-Rubin test whether the endogenous variables 
are jointly statistically significant (Anderson and Rubin, 1949); (vi) the Stock-Wright (2000) LM 
test. The latter two (closely related) test statistics are robust to the presence of weak instruments. The 
null hypothesis tested in both tests (v) and (vi) is that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in 
the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and moreover that the over-identifying restrictions 
are valid. In addition to passing these tests, Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix also reveal that our 
instruments pass (vii) the Hansen’s over-identification test (Hayashi 2000) of Model V in Tables 4-5, 
as well as Models I and VI which are exactly identified.
18
 
In Model II in Tables 4 and 5, we investigate whether changes in FEDTAX may affect 
STATETAX with a lag of one year (FEDTAX-1). State legislators may have a delayed reaction to 
federal legislation, or state legislation may not take effect until the following year.
19
 Model III 
includes only states without any changes in the term limit legislation during the sample time period, 
since changes in taxes and term limits may be simultaneously determined (Besley and Case 1995). 
States with term limit legislation may differ from those without such limits, and therefore Model IV 
includes only states having term limit legislation at some point during the sample period (see List 
and Sturm 2006). This implies dropping 11 states (see Table A1 in the appendix). Model V adds 
NEIGHBOR TAX, which seeks to control for horizontal tax interactions (see Brueckner 2003; 
Devereux et al. 2007). Following Rork (2003), we utilize the population weighted tax set by 
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 Although Models I and VI are exactly identified, for completeness we offer additional tests that show that 
these models pass the instrument relevance test (i.e., Shea's partial R
2
), under-identification tests, weak-
identification tests, and weak instrument-robust inference tests (i.e. joint significance of the endogenous 
regressors). 
19
 For example, California under Gov. Pete Wilson (R) raised the state cigarette tax in year 1994, after a 1993 
increase in the federal tax. 
 13 
neighboring states, instrumented by the population weighted state unemployment rate, the 
percentage of children and old in the population, and the proportion of Democrats in the state House 
(see also Devereux et al. 2007).  
Model VI includes a lagged dependent variable, STATETAXt–1. As argued by Devereux et al. 
(2007), a lagged dependent variable is likely to be appropriate if state taxes exhibit strong serial 
correlation. We instrument STATETAXt–1 by the second lag of the dependent variable. BEERTAX is 
included in Model VII and comes from the World Tax Data Base (2006); it adjusts for another sin 
tax. In Model VIII we drop all agricultural tobacco producing states, since they may exhibit a 
different approach to vertical interactions in cigarette taxes. It would be of concern if these states 
drive our results. Model IX includes DEFICIT-1, which is the state budget deficit as a percent of real 
gross state product (GSP), lagged one year. Finally, Model X adds three additional political 
economy related controls included by Fredriksson and Mamun (2008). Per capital sales (lagged one 
year), SALES-1, controls for the voting incentive of smokers and the lobbying pressure from cigarette 
producers and distributers (see, e.g., Dixit et al. 1997). Sale of cigarettes per square mile (lagged one 
year) is utilized to measure smokers’ and tobacco sellers’ ability to organize politically and thus gain 
political influence (CONCENTRATION). Politicians may be bribed or pressured by producer and 
other lobby groups to change, not change, or delay changing existing policies (CORRUPTION).
20
 
See the table notes for further details.  
Results of Robustness Analysis  
In Table 4, FEDTAX (and FEDTAX-1) and LAMEDUCK are positive and significant in all 
models, except in Model V, which includes a significantly positive NEIGHBOR TAX. The finding in 
Model V is consistent with Devereux et al.’s (2007) theoretical prediction that when demand is 
                                               
20
 State level corruption is measured by the number of convictions of public officials on corruption charges 
per 1000 public employees. The conviction data is collected from the U.S. Department of Justice (various 
years), and is used also by, e.g., Glaeser and Saks (2006), who suggest that corruption distorts policy and 
economic outcomes. 
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relatively price-inelastic and the incentive for cross-border shopping (inter-state arbitrage) is strong 
(characteristics they attribute to the U.S. cigarette market), horizontal tax competition should be 
intense. Simultaneously, vertical tax externalities should be non-existent in this case. They present 
empirical evidence supporting these predictions. However, we find that FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK is 
negative and significant in all models in Table 4, and that this interaction and FEDTAX are jointly 
significant in Model V (as in all other models in Table 4). Thus, we find that vertical tax externalities 
do occur even when competition occurs between neighboring states, in particular when the governor 
is a lame duck. In additional robustness analysis (not reported) we dropped the national level 
controls (NatlGDP and NatlUNEMPLOY), which may duplicate the effects of the already included 
corresponding state-level variables. This allows us to add year-specific dummies. This did not affect 
our results. Table 5 reveals a pattern similar to Table 3 regarding the variables of interest.
21
 
FEDTAX, REPLAME and FEDTAX×REPLAME are significant in all models with consistent signs 
except in Model V, and DEMOLAME and FEDTAX×DEMOLAME exhibit significance in all but 
three models.  
While adding NEIGHBOR TAX affects our FEDTAX results in Tables 4 and 5, none of our 
other robustness checks affect the results in material ways. Instrumenting FEDTAX in Model I 
causes both the coefficient size and significance level to rise. The FEDTAX-1 coefficient size is 
greater than in the remaining models, suggesting the full effect of federal tax changes may occur 
with a lag. Reducing the sample to states without changes to term limit legislation in Model III in 
Table 5 renders the DEMOLAME coefficients insignificant, perhaps due to a smaller sample size. 
Adding STATETAX-1 or BEERTAX in Models VI-VII in Tables 4-5, respectively, do not 
affect the coefficients of interest in material ways. Neither does focusing on states without tobacco 
production, adding a measure of the state budget deficit, or adding three political economy variables 
                                               
21
 In Tables 4 and 5, R
2
 takes values between 0.33 and 0.35, except in Model VI where it equals 0.75 (in both 
tables). 
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in Models VIII-X. The significant STATETAX-1 in Model VI causes a reduction of the FEDTAX 
coefficient size relative to other models.
22
 However, FEDTAX retains its significance level, which is 
in contrast to Devereux et al. (2007) where a lagged dependent variable reduced the significance 
level of the federal tax variable. Using Model VI in Table 5 as an example, we find that while re-
electable governors exhibit a positive response to an increase in FEDTAX, both Democratic and 
Republican lame ducks have a negative response.
23
 While this result is consistent for Republican 
lame ducks in all ten models in Table 5, Democratic lame ducks’ responses sometimes turn positive 
but remain small (as suggested by Model I, for example).  
The significant BEERTAX coefficient suggests that states tend to adopt an either pro- or anti-
sin stance, i.e. that beer and cigarette taxes are complements. DEFICIT-1 in Model IX does not reach 
significance in either Table 4 or 5. In Model X, the negative SALES and CONCENTRATION 
coefficients indicate that smoking voters and special interest groups are more successful in reducing 
the cigarette tax, the greater the amount at stake and the easier time they have to organize collective 
action.
24
  
IV. Conclusion 
 This paper provides novel evidence that reputation-building strategies by state governors 
affect their responses to federal tax policy changes. In particular, re-electable governors distort their 
responses to federal cigarette tax policies for electoral gains. While state governors in general exhibit 
a positive response in the state cigarette tax to changes in the federal cigarette tax, lame duck 
governors tend to have a negative response. Cigarette tax revenues consequently decline as a result 
                                               
22
 According to Model VI in Table 4, a 10 cent increase in FEDTAX yields a 1 cent decrease in STATETAX 
[10×(0.12–0.22)= –1] in years when the governor cannot run for re-election. 
23
 According to Model VI in Table 5, a 10 cent increase in FEDTAX yields 0.5 and 1.7 cent reductions in 
STATETAX by Democratic and Republican lame ducks, respectively. On the other hand, non-lame ducks raise 
STATETAX by 1.2 cents.  
24
 We also run models with the federal-level variables NatlGDP and NatlUNEMPLOY dropped (not reported; 
results available upon request), as these may duplicate the effects of the already included corresponding state-
level variables. We are then able to add year-specific dummies. The results remain intact. 
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of a federal tax increase in states governed by a lame duck, both due to a shrinking of the state tax 
base and a decline in the state tax rate. Moreover, we find some evidence that Republican governors 
tend to be more prone to engage in reputation-building activities. Republican lame duck governors 
exhibit a more negative response to federal tax policy changes.  
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Appendix I 
 
Table A1. Term Limit Legislation for Governors by State (1975-2000) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
States with no term limits (13 states): 
CT, ID, IL, IA, MA,
a
 MN, NH, NY, ND, TX, VT, WA,
b
 WI 
 
States limiting governors to one term in office:  
 VA 
 
States limiting governors to two terms in office (17 states): 
 AL, DE, FL, KS, LA, MD, ME, MO, NE, NJ, NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SD, WV 
 
State law changed from no term limit to a three-term limit:   
UT (1994) 
 
State law changed from no term limit to a two-term limit (8 states): 
 AZ (1992), AR (1992), CA (1990), CO (1990), MI (1992), MT (1992),  
RI (1994), WY (1992) 
 
State law changed from a one-term limit to a two-term limit (8 states): 
 GA (1976), IN (1972), KY (1992), NM (1991), MS (1986), NC (1977),  
SC (1980), TN (1978) 
Source: List and Sturm (2006). 
Notes: Year of term limit change in brackets. 
a. Term limits were enacted in 1994, but in 1997 the MA Supreme Court ruled them 
unconstitutional. 
b. Two-term term limits were enacted in 1992, but in 1998 the WA Supreme Court ruled them 
unconstitutional. 
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Table A2. Tests of IV Models Included in Table 4 
 
 
Tests  
Model 
 
I 
Model 
 
V 
Model 
 
VI 
Shea's Partial R
2
 
  FEDTAX 
  FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK 
  NEIGHBOR TAX 
  STATETAX-1 
0.31 
0.06 
 
 
 
0.16 
 
 
 
 
0.61 
Underidentification Tests 
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic [χ2()] 
  
 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic [χ2()]  
 
36.83 
[p=0.00] 
32.97 
[p=0.00] 
 
276.09 
[p=0.00] 
670.71 
[p=0.00] 
 
158,44 
[p=0.00] 
2046.83 
[p=0.00] 
Weak Identification Test 
 Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 
 
16.20 
 
164.03 
 
2006.04 
Weak Instrument – Robust Inference   
Anderson–Rubin Wald Test [χ2()] 
 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic [χ2()] 
 
35.71 
[p=0.00] 
33.65 
[p=0.00] 
 
42.02 
[p=0.00] 
37.64 
[p=0.00] 
 
412.30 
[p=0.00] 
98.98 
[p=0.00] 
Hansen's J–Statistic Overidentification Test  [p=0.18]  
 
 
Table A3. Tests of IV Models Included in Table 5 
 
 
Tests  
Model 
 
I 
Model 
 
V 
Model 
 
VI 
Shea's Partial R
2
 
  FEDTAX 
  FEDTAX×DEMOLAME 
  FEDTAX×DEMOLAME 
  NEIGHBOR TAX 
  STATETAX-1 
0.14 
0.01 
0.14 
 
 
 
0.17 
 
 
 
 
 
0.61 
Underidentification Tests 
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic [χ2()] 
  
 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic [χ2()]  
 
13.99 
[p=0.00] 
13.12 
[p=0.00] 
 
276.09 
[p=0.00] 
670.71 
[p=0.00] 
 
158,44 
[p=0.00] 
2046.83 
[p=0.00] 
Weak Identification Test 
 Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 
40.29 163.74 2002.33 
Weak Instrument – Robust Inference  
Anderson–Rubin Wald Test [χ2()] 
 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic [χ2()] 
 
18.86 
[p=0.02] 
18.41 
[p=0.02] 
 
41.75 
[p=0.00] 
37.58 
[p=0.00] 
 
418.95 
[p=0.00] 
99.38 
[p=0.00] 
Hansen's J–Statistic Overidentification Test  [p=0.13]  
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Figure 1: Real Federal Cigarette Tax Rates and State Cigarette Tax Rates 
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Note: Fig. 1 includes the three states with the greatest increases and the three states with the largest declines.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variables Definition Source Obs Mean Min Max 
STATETAX  
State excise tax (1983 centsUS) 
Orzechowski and 
Walker (2003) 
1222 18.11 1.45 64.46 
FEDTAX  
Federal tax (1983 centsUS) 
Orzechowski and 
Walker (2003) 
1248 13.94 8.29 19.75 
LAMEDUCK List and Sturm (2006) 1222 0.26 0 1 
DEMOLAME List and Sturm (2006) 1222 0.15 0 1 
REPLAME List and Sturm (2006) 1222 0.10 0 1 
NatlGDP 
national real GDP (1983 bn $US) 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce  
1222 3858 2472 5700 
NatlUNEMPLOY 
national unemployment rate 
U.S. Census Bureau  
 
1222 6.45 4 9.5 
POPULATION 
State population 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce  
1222 5143911 376000 3.40x10
7
 
INCOME 
personal income/capita (1983 $US) 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce  
1222 12944 7628 24097 
StateUNEMPLOY 
State unemployment rate 
U.S. Department of 
Labor  
1222 6.25 2.2 18 
CHILD 
portion of population age 5–17 
U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.20 0.16 0.26 
OVER65 
Portion of population over 65 
U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.12 0.7 0.19 
TOBACCO INCOME 
tobacco production/$US of state income 
USDA  1222 0.002 0 0.10 
GAS  
daily production/$US of state income 
U.S. Department of 
Energy  
1222 0.008 0 0.32 
GRANTS 
federal grants/capita (1983 $US) 
U.S. Census Bureau  1222 499 231 1192 
INCOME TAX 
federal income tax divided by adjusted 
gross income 
U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.14 0.06 0.19 
DEMOGOV 
dummy = 1, if the governor is a Democrat 
National Governors 
Association  
1222 0.55 0 1 
DEMOSENATE  
proportion of Democrats in State Senate  
U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.59 0 1 
DEMOHOUSE  
proportion of Democrats in State House  
U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.585 0 1 
SALES-1 
per capita cigarette sale lagged 1 year 
Orzechowski and 
Walker (2003) 
1222 1.14 0.39 2.80 
CORRUPT corruption convictions per 1000 
public employees 
US Department of 
Justice  
1182 0.04 0 0.33 
CONCENTRATION 
cigarette sales per square mile  
Orzechowski and 
Walker (2003) 
1222 0.02 0.0004 0.14 
BEER TAX 
State excise tax per gallon (1983 $US) 
World Tax Data Base 
(2006) 
1196 0.17 0.01 1.43 
DEFICIT-1 
state budget deficit (% of real GSP)  
lagged 1 year 
U.S. Census Bureau 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
1222 8.93 -17.05 55.93 
 
  
 
Table 2. Fixed Effect Estimations I: Basic Models 
Model I II III IV V 
FEDTAX 
0.37*** 
(3.27) 
0.36*** 
(3.13) 
0.33** 
(2.22) 
0.32** 
(2.75) 
0.14 
(0.77) 
LAMEDUCK 
6.79*** 
(4.89) 
6.74*** 
(4.80) 
6.77*** 
(4.88) 
6.60*** 
(5.25) 
6.90*** 
(5.74) 
FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK 
-0.47*** 
(4.22) 
-0.46*** 
(4.12) 
-0.47*** 
(4.17) 
-0.45*** 
(4.56) 
-0.47*** 
(4.89) 
DEMOGOV  
0.55** 
(2.28) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
0.51** 
(2.17) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
FEDTAX×DEMOGOV   
0.05 
(0.47) 
 
0.02 
(0.26) 
DEMOSENATE    
-0.80 
(0.72) 
3.76 
(0.67) 
FEDTAX×DEMOSENATE     
-0.31 
(0.79) 
DEMOHOUSE    
10.15*** 
(3.87) 
1.49 
(0.22) 
FEDTAX×DEMOHOUSE     
0.61 
(1.37) 
NatlGDP  
0.002** 
(2.08) 
0.002** 
(1.94) 
0.002** 
(1.96) 
0.002* 
(1.75) 
0.002* 
(1.73) 
NatlUNEMPLOY 
-0.11 
(0.48) 
-0.12 
(0.54) 
-0.12 
(0.56) 
-0.12 
(0.59) 
-0.13 
(0.66) 
POPULATION 
-1.4E-07*** 
(2.79) 
-1.4E-07*** 
(2.88) 
-1.4E-07*** 
(2.87) 
-10.5E-07* 
(1.93) 
-10.02E-07* 
(1.90) 
INCOME  
-0.005** 
(5.48) 
-0.005*** 
(5.50) 
-0.005*** 
(5.64) 
-0.005*** 
(5.21) 
-0.005*** 
(5.20) 
StateUNEMPLOY  
-0.21 
(1.43) 
-0.20 
(1.38) 
-0.21 
(1.39) 
-0.19 
(1.37) 
-0.19 
(1.37) 
CHILD 
127.07*** 
(5.48) 
128.31*** 
(5.56) 
128.06*** 
(5.63) 
112.76*** 
(5.48) 
115.88*** 
(5.72) 
OVER65 
-58.84*** 
(2.91) 
-57.80*** 
(2.88) 
-57.82*** 
(2.86) 
-58.27*** 
(2.89) 
-53.75** 
(2.49) 
TOBACCO INCOME 
-10.91 
(0.60) 
-7.57 
(0.41) 
-6.61 
(0.35) 
-27.50* 
(1.71) 
-23.30 
(-1.56) 
GAS  
15.34** 
(2.14) 
12.29** 
(2.23) 
15.08** 
(2.30) 
12.64* 
(1.96) 
13.23** 
(2.12) 
GRANTS  
-0.004 
(1.61) 
-0.003 
(1.53) 
-0.004 
(1.54) 
-0.003 
(1.52) 
-0.003 
(1.57) 
INCOME TAX 
-11.51 
(1.14) 
-10.81 
(1.05) 
-10.60 
(1.02) 
-9.31 
(0.84) 
-8.47 
(0.73) 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1222 1222 
Joint Signif. Test 
8.93 
[0.00] 
8.57 
[0.00] 
9.57 
[0.00] 
11.41 
[0.00] 
20.56 
[0.00] 
Notes: Fixed–effect estimations with robust standard errors for years 1975–2000 that allow for within-year 
correlation. The dependent variable is STATETAX. All models include a constant and square terms for 
POPULATION and INCOME, a time trend, and its square. 
***
(
**
)[
*
]
 
indicates significant at the 1(5)[10]% level, 
respectively. Joint significant test is an F-test for all variables involving FEDTAX. 
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Table 3. Fixed Effect Estimations II: Basic Models 
Model I II III IV V 
FEDTAX 
0.37*** 
(3.18) 
0.36*** 
(3.20) 
0.36** 
(2.34) 
0.32** 
(2.71) 
0.17 
(0.95) 
DEMOLAME 
5.56*** 
(3.16) 
5.41*** 
(3.08) 
2.39*** 
(3.27) 
5.31*** 
(3.11) 
5.74*** 
(3.56) 
REPLAME 
8.07*** 
(4.93) 
8.47*** 
(4.88) 
8.49*** 
(4.18) 
8.30*** 
(5.47) 
8.36*** 
(4.75) 
FEDTAX×DEMOLAME 
-0.37** 
(2.48) 
-0.37** 
(2.53) 
-0.37** 
(2.74) 
-0.37** 
(2.60) 
-0.40*** 
(3.01) 
FEDTAX×REPLAME 
-0.57*** 
(4.92) 
-0.58*** 
(4.88) 
-0.58*** 
(4.06) 
-0.56*** 
(5.59) 
-0.56*** 
(4.74) 
DEMOGOV  
0.59** 
(2.16) 
0.63 
(0.42) 
0.58** 
(12.20) 
0.78 
(0.59) 
FEDTAX×DEMOGOV   
-0.003 
(0.03) 
 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
DEMOSENATE    
-0.81 
(0.74) 
4.17 
(0.74) 
FEDTAX×DEMOSENATE     
-0.34 
(0.85) 
DEMOHOUSE    
10.15*** 
(3.87) 
1.40 
(0.21) 
FEDTAX×DEMOHOUSE     
0.62 
(1.37) 
NatlGDP  
0.002** 
(2.06) 
0.002* 
(1.87) 
0.002* 
(1.86) 
0.001* 
(1.67) 
0.001 
(1.63) 
NatlUNEMPLOY 
-0.11 
(0.51) 
-0.12 
(0.55) 
-0.12 
(0.55) 
-0.12 
(0.58) 
-0.13 
(0.64) 
POPULATION 
-1.4E-07*** 
(2.79) 
-1.4E-07** 
(2.80) 
-1.4E-07*** 
(2.78) 
-10.5E-07* 
(1.87) 
-10.1E-07* 
(1.83) 
INCOME  
-0.005*** 
(3.18) 
-0.005*** 
(5.52) 
-0.005*** 
(5.53) 
-0.005*** 
(5.21) 
-0.005*** 
(5.10) 
StateUNEMPLOY  
-0.21 
(1.42) 
-0.20 
(1.39) 
-0.20 
(1.37) 
-0.20 
(1.39) 
-0.19 
(1.34) 
CHILD 
125.72*** 
(5.47) 
128.82*** 
(5.61) 
128.83*** 
(5.62) 
113.74*** 
(5.56) 
116.92*** 
(5.75) 
OVER65 
-57.22** 
(2.74) 
-55.91** 
(2.74) 
-55.89** 
(2.71) 
-56.61** 
(2.77) 
-52.43** 
(2.39) 
TOBACCO INCOME 
-7.78 
(0.41) 
-4.88 
(0.25) 
-4.90 
(0.25) 
-24.88 
(1.46) 
-23.87 
(1.40) 
GAS  
15.06** 
(2.16) 
15.30** 
(2.28) 
15.31** 
(2.35) 
12.71** 
(2.03) 
13.44** 
(2.18) 
GRANTS  
-0.004 
(1.62) 
-0.003 
(1.52) 
-0.003 
(1.52) 
-0.003 
(1.50) 
-0.003 
(1.55) 
INCOME TAX 
-11.29 
(1.12) 
-10.45 
(1.02) 
-10.46 
(1.01) 
-8.93 
(0.82) 
-8.39 
(0.73) 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1222 1222 
Joint Signif. Test 
8.45 
[0.00] 
8.32 
[0.00] 
6.56 
[0.00] 
10.51 
[0.00] 
15.81 
[0.00] 
Notes: See Table 2 notes.  
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Table 4. Fixed Effect Estimations: Robustness Analysis I  
Model 
I 
 
IV 
 
 
II 
 
LAG 
FEDTAX 
 
III 
 
NO T. 
LIMIT 
CHNGE 
IV 
 
ONLY T. 
LIMIT 
STATES 
V 
 
HORIZ. 
INTER 
ACTION 
VI 
 
LDV 
 
 
VII 
 
BEER 
TAX 
 
VIII 
 
NON- 
TOBAC 
STATES 
IX 
 
STATE 
DEFICIT 
X 
 
PE 
VARS 
FEDTAX 
0.68*** 
(5.49) 
 
0.29** 
(2.56) 
0.32** 
(2.61) 
0.14 
(1.40) 
0.12** 
(2.18) 
0.32*** 
(2.88) 
0.28** 
(2.30) 
0.33*** 
(2.89) 
0.31*** 
(2.89) 
LAMEDUCK 
18.22
***
 
(3.11) 
6.95*** 
(3.54) 
4.09*** 
(2.97) 
5.95*** 
(4.48) 
5.18*** 
(2.77) 
3.29*** 
(3.83) 
6.71*** 
(5.23) 
5.77*** 
(3.52) 
6.72*** 
(5.41) 
4.86*** 
(4.27) 
FEDTAX× 
LAMEDUCK 
-1.27*** 
(3.03) 
 
-0.26*** 
(2.85) 
-0.41*** 
(3.95) 
-0.35** 
(2.56) 
-0.22*** 
(3.61) 
-0.46*** 
(4.60) 
-0.47*** 
(4.32) 
-0.46*** 
(4.73) 
-0.32*** 
(3.76) 
FEDTAX-1  
0.48*** 
(4.15) 
        
FEDTAX-1× 
LAMEDUCK 
 
-0.49*** 
(3.48) 
        
NEIGHBOR 
TAX 
    
0.58*** 
(5.63) 
     
STATETAX-1      
0.83*** 
(28.06) 
    
BEERTAX       
7.60*** 
(3.70) 
   
DEFICIT-1         
0.03 
(1.20) 
 
SALES-1          
-0.17*** 
(6.31) 
CORRUPT          
0.39 
(1.13) 
CONCEN–
TRATION 
         
-2.20*** 
(6.05) 
Standard 
Controls? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1222 1248 728 936 1170 1128 1196 780 1222 1182 
F-test of 
Joint Sign.  
of Instrument 
Set 
321.05 
[0.00] 
 25.86 
[0.00] 
  
 40.38 
[0.00] 
 
 
841.39 
[0.00] 
 
 
  
  
Joint Signif. 
Test 
31.35 
[0.00] 
8.71 
[0.00] 
4.43 
[0.02] 
7.80 
[0.00] 
6.51 
[0.04] 
13.15 
[0.00] 
11.36 
[0.00] 
9.85 
[0.00] 
12.00 
[0.00] 
8.29 
[0.00] 
Notes: Fixed–effect estimations with robust standard errors for years 1975–2000 that allow for within-year correlation (except for 
Model I, V and VI, where z-statistics is reported). The dependent variable is STATETAX. 
***
(
**
)[
*
]
 
indicates significant at the 
1(5)[10]% level, respectively. F–statistics are provided for the joint significance of the instrumented variables in Models I, V, and 
VI. The joint significance test is for all variables which include FEDTAX. Standard controls included in all models (results available 
upon request) are: DEMOGOV, DEMOSENATE, DEMOHOUSE, NatlGDP, NatlUNEMPLOY, POPULATION, INCOME, 
StateUNEMPLOY, CHILD, OVER65, TOBACCO INCOME, GAS, GRANTS, INCOME TAX, square terms for POPULATION and 
INCOME, a constant, a time trend and its square.  
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Table 5. Fixed Effect Estimations: Robustness Analysis II 
Model 
I 
 
IV 
 
 
II 
 
LAG 
FEDTAX 
 
III 
 
NO T. 
LIMIT 
CHNGE 
IV 
 
ONLY T. 
LIMIT 
STATES 
V 
 
HORIZ. 
INTER 
ACTION 
VI 
 
LDV 
 
 
VII 
 
BEER 
TAX 
 
VIII 
 
NON- 
TOBAC 
STATES 
IX 
 
STATE 
DEFICIT 
X 
 
PE 
VARS 
FEDTAX 
0.64*** 
(5.43) 
 
0.29** 
(2.57) 
0.32** 
(2.57) 
0.14 
(1.42) 
0.12** 
(2.17) 
0.32*** 
(2.84) 
0.28** 
(2.30) 
0.32*** 
(2.85) 
0.32*** 
(2.88) 
DEMOLAME 
13.22** 
(2.11) 
5.67** 
(2.79) 
1.84 
(0.68) 
4.48*** 
(2.67) 
5.57*** 
(3.27) 
2.54*** 
(2.70) 
5.71*** 
(3.46) 
4.13 
(1.63) 
5.36*** 
(3.15) 
3.11* 
(1.72) 
REPLAME 
19.77** 
(2.38) 
9.29*** 
(4.26) 
5.69*** 
(3.90) 
8.06*** 
(4.50) 
5.55* 
(1.79) 
4.25*** 
(4.32) 
8.05*** 
(5.04) 
9.24*** 
(3.58) 
8.50*** 
(5.49) 
6.82*** 
(4.69) 
FEDTAX× 
DEMOLAME 
-0.93** 
(2.09) 
 
-0.10 
(0.53) 
-0.33** 
(2.31) 
-0.42*** 
(3.47) 
-0.17*** 
(2.76) 
-0.40** 
(2.95) 
-0.39* 
(1.91) 
-0.37** 
(2.65) 
-0.20 
(1.40) 
FEDTAX× 
REPLAME 
-1.36** 
(2.30) 
 
-0.38*** 
(4.17) 
-0.54*** 
(4.64) 
-0.33 
(1.47) 
-0.29*** 
(4.00) 
-0.55*** 
(5.22) 
-0.65*** 
(4.32) 
-0.58*** 
(5.63) 
-0.45*** 
(4.92) 
FEDTAX-1  
0.47*** 
(4.15) 
        
FEDTAX-1× 
DEMOLAME 
 
-0.40** 
(2.68) 
        
FEDTAX-1× 
REPLAME 
 
-0.65*** 
(4.34) 
        
NEIGHBOR 
TAX 
    
0.57*** 
(5.55) 
     
STATETAX-1      
0.83*** 
(28.25) 
    
BEERTAX       
7.47*** 
(3.74) 
 
   
DEFICIT-1         
0.03 
(1.21) 
 
SALES-1          
-0.17*** 
(6.34) 
CORRUPT          
0.40 
(1.17) 
CONCEN–
TRATION 
         
-2.20*** 
(6.01) 
Standard 
Controls? 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1222 1222 728 936 1170 1128 1196 780 1222 1182 
F-test of 
Joint Sign.  
of Instrument 
Set 
216.01 
[0.00] 
 10.65 
[0.00] 
 9.50 
[0.00] 
   
43.00 
[0.00] 
 
 
 
 
854.71 
[0.00] 
 
 
 
 
    
Joint Signif. 
Test 
32.10 
[0.00] 
7.09 
[0.00] 
6.54 
[0.00] 
7.97 
[0.00] 
12.78 
[0.01] 
16.32 
[0.00] 
9.08 
[0.00] 
6.48 
[0.00] 
10.58 
[0.00] 
8.43 
[0.00] 
Notes: See Table 4 notes. 
 
